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(105) 
RFF FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, LP v. BURNS & LEVINSON, LLP: 
MASSACHUSETTS CONSTRUCTS A FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
IN-FIRM PRIVILEGE AND EXPOSES OTHER STATES’ NEED FOR 
RENOVATION 
KELSEY HUGHES-BLAUM* 
“In law, as in architecture, form should follow function, and we prefer a 
formulation of the attorney-client privilege that encourages attorneys faced with 
the threat of legal action by a client to seek the legal advice of in-house ethics 
counsel . . . .”1 
I. LAYING THE FOUNDATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO IN-FIRM COUNSEL AND 
THE “CURRENT-CLIENT” ISSUE 
Lawyers make mistakes just like everyone else.2  Yet, the unique world of 
legal practice, with its emphasis on protecting client confidences, raises the 
question: Who can lawyers turn to if they make a mistake?3  Because a lawyer’s 
most innocent error can have devastating consequences, professional liability 
insurers are increasingly urging firms to hire in-house ethics counsel to advise 
attorneys on preventing and responding to malpractice claims.4  A 2005 survey 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate 2015, Villanova University School of Law.  This Note is dedicated to 
my father, James Blaum, who has served as a role model and constant source of 
encouragement throughout my law school career.  I would like to thank my family and friends 
for their endless support, and the editorial staff of the Villanova Law Review for their valuable 
input and assistance throughout the writing process.  
1.  RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080 (Mass. 
2013) (preserving attorney-client privilege for in-firm communications). 
2.  See Corinne Cooper, Teaching Associates to Make Mistakes, L. PRAC. MGMT. 
(July/Aug. 1993), available at http://www.professionalpresence.com/html/articles/mistake
management.php (“It’s time we admitted frankly that attorneys make mistakes.  No matter 
how hard you work, nor how carefully you prepare, you are going to fumble.  Mistakes don’t 
end with experience or partnership.  Attorneys are only human, and to err is, after all, our 
most human characteristic.”). 
3.  See Ronald D. Rotunda, Why Lawyers Are Different and Why We Are the Same: 
Creating Structural Incentives in Large Law Firms to Promote Ethical Behavior—In-House 
Ethics Counsel, Bill Padding, and In-House Ethics Training, 44 AKRON L. REV. 679, 703 
(2011) (describing ethical challenges unique to law firms and inquiring “[t]o whom, then, 
should the lawyer raise questions?”); see also Carolyn Elefant, When Lawyers Make Mistakes, 
LAW.COM (Feb. 7, 2005), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005542170&When_
Lawyers_Make_Mistakes&slreturn=20130822180835 (noting that attorneys’ obligation to 
protect client confidentiality forces many lawyers to conceal their errors).   
4.  See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1721, 1758–59 (2005) (“[L]iability insurers increasingly are encouraging law firms to appoint 
in-house counsel.”); Jeremy A. Gogel, An Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege: Intra-
Firm Communications About Potential Legal Malpractice Claims, 54 FOR DEF., No. 4, Apr. 
2012, at 66, 66, available at http://dritoday.org/ftd/2012-04F.pdf (“With the number of legal 
malpractice and ethics inquiries on the rise, law firms have sought to lessen the potential 
impact from these actions by appointing one or more members of their firms as general 
counsel.”).  The Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society (ALAS) is a risk retention group that 
insures approximately 58,000 attorneys in over forty-five states.  See About the ALAS 
1
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revealed that seventy percent of the nation’s largest firms appoint in-house 
counsel.5  The accessibility of law firm in-house counsel affords attorneys the 
opportunity to address and rectify their mistakes before it is too late.6 
While the availability of in-house counsel may answer questions 
concerning a lawyer’s ability to seek advice, it also warrants further inquiry.7  
Prior to engaging in candid communication with in-house counsel, the 
thoughtful lawyer will hesitate, wondering: Well, are these communications 
protected under the attorney-client privilege?8  Generally, communications 
between a firm’s attorneys and its in-house counsel are protected under the 
privilege.9  Nevertheless, several courts have refused to extend the privilege 
where the in-firm communications involved a current client.10  These decisions 
 
Companies, ALAS, http://www.alas.com/public/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) 
(describing scope of business and services provided).  ALAS’s most recent report illustrates 
that professional liability claims are an unfortunate yet inevitable byproduct of modern legal 
practice.  See ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2012), 
available at http://www.alas.com/public/AnnualReport2012.pdf (discussing prevalence of 
professional liability claims).  In 2012 alone, ALAS saw 8.5 malpractice claims reported per 
every 1,000 lawyers.  See id. 
5.  See Rotunda, supra note 3, at 705 (describing results reported by 2005 survey).  The 
2005 survey results reflected a sixty-three percent increase in firms appointing in-house 
counsel from 2004.  See id. (noting increase from prior year).  Additionally, ninety-two 
percent of lawyers serving as in-house counsel were also partners at their respective firms.  
See id. 
6.  See id. at 705–06 (“[O]ne study showed that, over a five-year period, law firms that 
employ general counsel . . . spend $1 million less on defense costs and indemnity payments in 
connection with malpractice claims.  Because these firms are more ethical, they have fewer 
malpractice claims.” (citing Anthony E. Davis, The Emergence of Law Firm General Counsel 
and the Challenges Ahead, 20 PROF. LAW., NO. 2, 2010, at 1)). 
7.  See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1766 (admitting use of firm in-house counsel raises 
ethical questions). 
8.  See Gogel, supra note 4 (cautioning attorneys and in-house counsel to become 
familiar with their jurisdiction’s case law before seeking or giving advice).  See generally 
Allison D. Rhodes & Peter Tran, The Attorney-Client Privilege May Not Protect 
Communications Between Firm In-House Counsel and Firm Lawyers, ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L 
RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibi
lity/39th_conf_session11_atty_client_privilege_between_in_house_counsel_and_firm_lawyer
s.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (“In light of recent court decisions, lawyers 
need to be aware that communications with in-house counsel about a potential legal 
malpractice claim may not be protected by the attorney-client privilege.”). 
9.  See, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing in-
firm privilege for associates assigned to internal investigation); Hertzog, Calamari & Gleason 
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 850 F. Supp. 255, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding privileged 
communications between firm’s attorneys and its in-house counsel); Lama Holding Co. v. 
Shearman & Sterling, No. 89 Civ. 3639, 1991 WL 115052 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 1991) (holding 
privilege attaches to in-firm communication so long as in-house counsel is designated as 
such).   
10.  See, e.g., Asset Funding Grp., LLC v. Adams & Reese, LLP, Civil Action No. 07-
2965, 2008 WL 4948835 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2008) (declining to apply privilege due to 
conflict between firm’s fiduciary duties to itself and to client); Thelen Reid & Priest LLP v. 
Marland, No. C 06-2071 VRW, 2007 WL 578989 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007) (rejecting in-firm 
privilege based on fiduciary relationship and conflicting interest between client and lawyer); 
Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287 (S.D.N.Y 
2002) (rejecting in-firm privilege); Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, 
Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 284–85 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (rejecting in-firm 
2
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abrogating privilege in the current-client context rely on Pennsylvania 
precedent, the foundation of which has since been highly criticized.11 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was the first state supreme 
court to address in-firm privilege in RFF Family Partnership, LP v. Burns & 
Levinson, LLP.12  In this landmark ruling, the court rejected prior precedent and 
held that the attorneys’ communications with in-house counsel were protected 
by the attorney-client privilege.13 
While many have applauded the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s 
ruling in RFF Family Partnership, some have expressed concern that it 
“protects the interests of lawyers over those of the clients.”14  This Note 
disagrees with critics and argues that this Massachusetts ruling provides a 
functional framework for in-firm privilege from which the interests of both 
lawyers and their clients are served.15  Part II provides an overview of in-firm 
 
privilege); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 595, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (denying in-firm 
privilege in current-client context); SonicBlue Inc. v. Portside Growth & Opportunity Fund, 
Bankr. Nos. 03-51775, 03-51776, 03-51777, 03-51778-MM, 2008 WL 170562 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 18, 2008) (holding law firms cannot assert privilege against client when 
communications arise out of self-representation on conflict of interests grounds). 
11.  See, e.g., Asset Funding Grp., 2008 WL 4948835 (declining to apply privilege due 
to conflict between firm’s fiduciary duties to itself and to client); Thelen Reid & Priest, 2007 
WL 578989 (rejecting in-firm privilege based on fiduciary relationship and conflicting interest 
between client and lawyer); Bank Brussels Lambert, 220 F. Supp. at 287 (rejecting in-firm 
privilege); Koen Book Distribs., 212 F.R.D. at 284–85 (relying on Sunrise in rejecting in-firm 
privilege); In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D at 595–96 (refusing attorney-client privilege protection in 
case involving current client); SonicBlue, 2008 WL 170562 (holding law firm could not assert 
privilege against client when communications arise out of self-representation on conflict of 
interests grounds).  In Sunrise, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania was the first court to analyze the issue of in-firm privilege.  See Chambliss, 
supra note 4, at 1728 (“The first case to consider a claim of in-firm privilege was In re 
Sunrise . . . .”).  After Sunrise, several courts adopted Pennsylvania’s reasoning to circumvent 
the attorney-client privilege in current-client cases.  See id.  
12.  See RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 
(Mass. 2013) (“Neither this court nor any other court of last resort in the United States appears 
to have addressed the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to a law firm’s in-house 
communications concerning a current client.”). 
13.  See id. at 1080–81 (recognizing privilege for in-firm communications relating to 
current client’s malpractice claim). 
14.  Joan C. Rogers, ABA Formally Backs Privilege in Consults with Inside Counsel, 
CORP. L. DAILY, Aug. 23, 2013, at 1 [hereinafter Rogers, ABA Formally Backs Privilege] 
(noting Association of Corporate Counsel’s opposition to in-firm privilege in current-client 
context).  The Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC) has argued “clients pay law firms to 
serve them as advocates, not fight them as adversaries.”  Id. at 2 (describing ACC’s stance 
that law firms’ duty of loyalty should prohibit firms from claiming privilege to hide 
information from current clients).  For further discussion of the ACC’s stance on in-firm 
privilege, see infra note 132 and accompanying text.  See generally Richard Zitrin, Viewpoint: 
Law Firms Gain Secrecy at the Expense of Client Loyalty, THE RECORDER (July 19, 2013), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202611391549&Viewpoint_Law_Firms_G
ain_Secrecy_at_the_Expense_of_Client_Loyalty (“I have to conclude that courts ruling this 
way are simply protecting the interests of lawyers over those of clients, and that is 
inexcusable.”). 
15.  See ABA Resolution 103 (adopted June 2013) (“[T]he American Bar Association 
3
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privilege and discusses how courts had analyzed its application to in-firm 
communications leading up to RFF Family Partnership.16  Part III details the 
facts, procedural history, and holding of the decision.17  Part IV analyzes the 
court’s holding and argues that RFF Family Partnership provides a practical 
approach to in-firm privilege that is limited enough to benefit firms, lawyers, 
and their clients.18  Part V concludes by asserting that many jurisdictions will 
need to rethink their approaches to in-firm privilege in light of Massachusetts’s 
improved framework.19 
II. THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF IN-FIRM PRIVILEGE: AN OVERVIEW OF EVIDENCE, 
ETHICS, AND APPLICATIONS 
The issue of in-firm privilege arises out of a complex interplay between the 
evidentiary and ethical rules governing today’s legal profession.20  While the 
attorney-client privilege functions to promote candor between attorneys and 
their clients by protecting certain communications from discovery in litigation, 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct complicate the privilege’s application 
to in-firm communications.21  Moreover, because law firm in-house counsel 
was and still remains a fairly new development, the first court to interpret in-
firm privilege relied on questionable case law, which resulted in poorly 
reasoned analysis.22  More than two decades after the seminal case of In re 
Sunrise Securities Litigation,23 courts and critics are beginning to recognize the 
weak foundation upon which in-firm privilege has been rejected in the past and 
the need for a reconstructed framework in the future.24 
 
recognizes that client representation will be advanced by permitting [in-firm] confidential 
consultation . . . .”); see also Justin Fields, Viewpoint: Attorney-Client Privilege Is for 
Lawyers, Too, THE RECORDER (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA
.jsp?id=1202615401043&Viewpoint_AttorneyClient_Privilege_Is_for_Lawyers_Too&slretur
n=20130903063815 (recognizing advantages of RFF Family Partnership to lawyers and 
clients). 
16.  For a further discussion of the attorney-client privilege and how courts have 
applied it in the past, see infra notes 20–84 and accompanying text. 
17.  For a further discussion of the facts, holding, and rationale of RFF Family 
Partnership, see infra notes 85–122 and accompanying text. 
18.  For a further discussion of the public reaction to RFF Family Partnership and how 
Massachusetts’s framework serves the interests of firms and clients, see infra notes 123–63 
and accompanying text.  
19.  For a further discussion of how RFF Family Partnership will impact other 
jurisdictions, see infra notes 164–69 and accompanying text. 
20.  See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1767 (“Law firms’ reliance on in-house counsel 
carries responsibilities as well as privileges . . . .”). 
21.  See infra notes 25–46 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary and ethical 
complexities surrounding in-firm privilege).  
22.  See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1728 (“The first case to consider a claim of in-firm 
privilege was In re Sunrise . . . .” (citing In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D 560, 597 (E.D. 
Pa. 1989))); see also Douglas R. Richmond, Essential Principles for Law Firm General 
Counsel, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 806, 832 (2005) [hereinafter Richmond, Essential Principles] 
(describing Sunrise as “wrongly decided”). 
23.  130 F.R.D 560 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
24.  See TattleTale Alarm Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 2:10-cv-
226, 2011 WL 382627, at *4–10 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011) (noting that any decision relying on 
4
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A. An Evidentiary Infrastructure with Ethical Implications 
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the common law privileges 
protecting confidential communications.25  The privilege exists to encourage 
“full and frank communication” between attorney and client.26  To achieve this 
level of candor, the privilege shields attorney-client communications from 
discovery in litigation.27 
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,28 the United States Supreme Court held 
that the attorney-client privilege extends to communications between a 
corporation’s in-house counsel and its employees.29  Furthermore, courts have 
recognized that when a government entity hires an attorney as in-house counsel, 
the legal advice that in-house counsel provides is protected under the attorney-
client privilege.30  Like these other entities, law firms generally enjoy the 
 
Sunrise’s line of reasoning “merits a closer look”); see also William T. Barker, Law Firm In-
House Attorney-Client Privilege Vis-à-Vis Current Clients: Courts Should Reconsider and 
Limit the Rule that In-House Communications Are Not Protected Against Current Clients, 70 
DEF. COUNS. J. 467, 471 (2003) (noting that flawed Sunrise reasoning has become foundation 
for in-firm cases and urging courts to reconsider its application). 
25.  See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)); see also Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm 
Internal Investigations: Principles and Perils, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69, 71 (2004) 
[hereinafter Richmond, Internal Investigations] (describing attorney-client privilege as oldest 
of common law privileges and noting that it has now been widely codified). 
26.  See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (discussing purpose of privilege). 
27.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000) 
(“[T]he attorney-client privilege may be invoked . . . with respect to (1) a communication (2) 
made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or 
providing legal assistance for the client.”). 
28.  449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
29.  See id. at 403–04 (holding that communications by corporation’s employees to 
counsel were privileged).  In Upjohn, the communications at issue were made by employees 
to in-house counsel in order to secure legal advice.  See id. at 394 (discussing communications 
sought in discovery).  The Court reasoned that it was consistent with the purposes underlying 
the attorney-client privilege that these communications be “protected against compelled 
exposure.”  Id. at 395 (providing rationale for protecting communications); see also Brendan 
F. Quigley, The Need to Know: Law Firm Internal Investigations and the Intra-Firm 
Dissemination of Privileged Communications, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 889, 891 (2007) 
(citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396) (discussing holding of Upjohn). 
 Furthermore, as within corporations, the attorney-client privilege preserves partnerships’ 
communications with in-house counsel.  See In re Beiter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that attorney-client privilege framework for corporations also applies to 
partnerships); see also Richmond, Internal Investigations, supra note 25, at 74 (“With respect 
to partnerships, it is generally the rule that all partners are considered ‘to be the “client” in all 
attorney-client communications that involve the partnership.’” (quoting PAUL R. RICE ET AL., 
ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:49, at 266 (2d ed. 1999))).  
30.  See Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 870 N.E.2d 33, 38–39 
(Mass. 2007) (finding legal advice from in-house counsel to government entity and its 
employees was protected “under the normal rules of the attorney-client privilege”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 cmt. b, 573–74 (1998) 
(“The privilege aids government entities and employees in obtaining legal advice founded on 
a complete and accurate factual picture.”); Anthony B. Joyce, The Massachusetts Approach to 
the Intersection of Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege and Open Government Laws, 42 
5
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attorney-client privilege protection for communications with in-house 
counsel.31  Yet, whether application of the privilege to in-firm consultations 
regarding a current client complies with the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct has been a topic of much debate.32 
Lawyers’ ethical obligations are outlined in various state apadtations of the 
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.33  Unlike 
the attorney-client privilege, which applies only the context of litigation, Rules 
of Professional Conduct apply to all lawyers in all contexts.34  The emergence 
of in-house counsel in law firms warrants particular focus on Model Rules 1.6, 
1.7, and 1.10.35 
Model Rule 1.6 details an attorney’s ethical obligation of confidentiality.36  
 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 957, 960 (2009) (“The SJC’s ruling [in Suffolk Constr. Co.] solidified the 
governmental attorney-client privilege in Massachusetts . . . .”). 
31.  See, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing 
in-firm privilege for associates assigned to internal investigation); Hertzog, Calamari & 
Gleason v. Prudential Ins. Co., 850 F. Supp. 255, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (preserving privilege 
for communications between firm’s attorneys and its in-house counsel); Lama Holding Co. v. 
Shearman & Sterling, No. 89-Civ-3639(KTD), 1991 WL 115052 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding 
privilege attaches to in-firm communication so long as in-house counsel is designated as 
such). 
32.  Compare Asset Funding Grp., LLC v. Adams & Reese, LLP, Civil Action No. 07-
2965, 2008 WL 4948835, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2008) (denying in-firm privilege in 
current-client context), Thelen Reid & Priest LLP v. Marland, No. C 06-2071 VRW, 2007 
WL 578989, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007) (denying in-firm privilege in current-client 
context), Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying in-firm privilege in current-client context), Koen Book Distribs. v. 
Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 284–85 
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (denying in-firm privilege in current-client context), In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 
130 F.R.D. 560, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (denying in-firm privilege in current-client context), and 
SonicBlue Inc. v. Portside Growth & Opportunity Fund, Bankr. Nos. 03–51775, 03–51776, 
03–51777, 03–51778–MM, 2008 WL 170562, at *10 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008) 
(denying in-firm privilege in current-client context), with TattleTale Alarm Sys. v. Calfee, 
Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 2:10–cv–226, 2011 WL 382627, at *4–10 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 
2011) (preserving privilege in current-client context), St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, 
Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 108 (Ga. 2013) (preserving privilege in current-
client context), Garvy v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 966 N.E.2d 523, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) 
(preserving privilege in current-client context), MLA City Apartments LLC v. DLA Piper 
LLP (US), 967 N.E.2d 424, 433 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (preserving privilege in current-client 
context), and RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080 
(Mass. 2013) (preserving privilege in current-client context). 
33.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (2012) (identifying purpose of 
rules). 
34.  See id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (“The attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine 
apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or 
otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client.”); see also Leonard Packel, 
Confidentiality Under the Pennsylvania Attorney-Client Privilege Statutes and the New 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 VILL. L. REV. 91, 92 (1989) (“[T]he 
Privileges and Rules are aimed at different audiences.”). 
35.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1077–80 (discussing these three rules in 
context of in-firm privilege).  For further discussion on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court’s analysis of these rules in relation to in-firm privilege, see infra notes 110–16 and 
accompanying text. 
36.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (outlining lawyers’ confidentiality 
obligations). 
6
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Rule 1.6(a) requires that, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client . . . .”37  Where the attorney-client privilege protects 
only confidential communication made for the purpose of procuring legal 
advice, Rule 1.6 protects all information “relating to representation.”38  Thus, 
Rule 1.6 also “protects knowledge which the lawyer has acquired from sources 
other than communications.”39  Rule 1.6(b) grants exceptions to the rule, 
however, when lawyers seek legal advice for purposes of ensuring their 
compliance with the Model Rules, or defending themselves against a client’s 
claim.40 
The exceptions that Rule 1.6(b) provides, which ultimately allow a lawyer 
to reveal client information when seeking certain legal advice, become 
controversial when the lawyer seeks such advice from a law firm’s in-house 
counsel.41  Rule 1.7 provides that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.”42  The rule states that 
a conflict of interest exists if “(1) the representation of one client will be 
directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the 
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
 
37.  Id. at R. 1.6(a) (precluding lawyers from revealing client information related to 
representation); see also Sue Michmerhuizen, Confidentiality, Privilege: A Basic Value in 
Two Different Applications, ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESP. (May 2007), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/confi
dentiality_or_attorney.authcheckdam.pdf (“A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer 
relationship is that, in the absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal 
information relating to the representation. . . .  This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark 
of the client-lawyer relationship.” (alteration in original) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2)). 
 38.  See Packel, supra note 34, at 95 (discussing “communications” as narrower than 
“information”). 
39.  Id. at 97 (illustrating difference between communication protected by privilege 
versus communication protected by Rule 1.6).  Professor Packel provides a thoughtful 
example of this distinction:  
[A]ssume that the client had been released on bail and that the lawyer were to 
suggest to the client that she would like to see his records relating to the incidents 
involved in the case.  The client suggests that he will pick up the lawyer and drive 
her to the place where he has the records.  The lawyer is picked up and sees that the 
client has driven her to a home in New Jersey.  It is obvious when they arrive that 
the client is living at the home.  The lawyer’s observations would give her 
“information,” but that information would not be learned through 
“communications” and, therefore, would not be protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.  The Rules, however, would protect that information. 
Id. (providing example of Rule 1.6’s broad protection over all information relating to 
representation).   
40.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4)–(5) (providing exceptions to 
Rule 1.6(a), which precludes attorneys from revealing information related to client’s 
representation).  
41.  See Richmond, Essential Principles, supra note 22, at 821 (“[C]ourts have 
essentially fashioned a conflict of interest exception to the attorney-client privilege . . . in the 
law firm context.”). 
42.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (describing ethical duty to avoid 
conflict of interest). 
7
Hughes-Blaum: RFF Family Partnership, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP: Massachusett
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
112 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 59: p. 105 
responsibilities to another client . . . or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”43 
Rule 1.7 becomes especially relevant to in-firm privilege cases through 
imputation under Rule 1.10.44  Rule 1.10(a) states, “[w]hile lawyers are 
associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any 
one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 
1.7 . . . .”45  Under this analysis, when a client threatens malpractice and the 
accused attorney consults in-house counsel on the matter, the law firm violates 
Rule 1.7 because it is representing both the outside client and itself as a client, 
and these two “clients” possess adverse interests.46 
B. Off to a Shaky Start: Early Applications of In-Firm Privilege Point 
Towards a Need for Reconstruction 
The question of in-firm privilege first surfaced in the late 1980s.47  The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was the 
first court to decide a claim of in-firm privilege in Sunrise.48  In Sunrise, the 
law firm of Blank Rome represented Sunrise Savings and Loan Association.49  
Because Sunrise was insolvent, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation and Sunrise depositors sued Blank Rome.50  During discovery, 
Blank Rome claimed the attorney-client privilege for internal communications 
between the firm and its in-house counsel.51  While the court in Sunrise 
 
43.  Id. at R. 1.7(a)(1)–(2) (defining conflict of interest). 
44.  See RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1078 n.8 
(Mass. 2013) (noting that courts implicitly apply Rule 1.10 in abrogating privilege under 
conflict of interest theory). 
45.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) (describing imputation rule); see 
also Chambliss, supra note 4 at 1747–48 (“The primary reasons for imputation are to ‘[give] 
effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law 
firm’ and to prevent the misuse of confidential information by lawyers in the same firm.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 cmt. 2)). 
46.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1078–79 (explaining traditional invocation 
of imputation through Model Rules in current-client cases). 
47.  See Richmond, Internal Investigations, supra note 25, at 77–78  (“Law firms’ 
ability to invoke the attorney-client privilege . . . to protect the results of their internal 
investigations has been an issue since the 1980s, when firms that represented failed financial 
institutions found themselves embroiled in litigation resulting from those institutions’ 
demise.”). 
48.  See In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 569 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (analyzing in-
firm privilege claim); see also Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1728 (recognizing Sunrise as first 
decision analyzing claim of in-firm privilege). 
49.  See In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 562 (describing nature of Blank Rome’s 
representation). 
50.  See id. (explaining initial source of litigation). 
51.  See id. at 594 (“Blank Rome withholds 31 documents on the basis that they reflect 
requests for legal advice made by Blank Rome to Blank Rome attorneys or outside counsel.” 
(footnote omitted)).  Moreover, Blank Rome divided the documents it sought to withhold into 
four categories: (1) “post-suit documents” where the firm acted as its own counsel; (2) “post-
suit documents” where the firm was relying on outside counsel; (3) “post-suit documents” 
concerning the firm’s “continued representation of savings & loan associations generally”; 
and (4) documents pertaining to the firm’s representation of Sunrise Savings.  See id. (listing 
four categories of documents). 
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recognized the possibility of in-firm privilege “in some instances,” it hesitated 
to extend protection to Blank Rome’s communications because of a potential 
conflict of interest between the firm’s two clients, i.e., the original client and the 
firm itself.52 
The court eventually concluded that the interest “in protecting clients who 
may be harmed by such a conflict of interest” outweighed the interest in 
preserving the privilege for the law firm’s communications with in-house 
counsel.53  Relying on Valente v. PepsiCo,54 the Sunrise court held that a law 
firm’s communications with in-house counsel are not protected by the attorney-
client privilege “if the communication implicates or creates a conflict of interest 
between a law firm’s fiduciary duties to itself and its client seeking to discover 
the communication.”55 
After the Sunrise decision, several courts adopted its reasoning, citing it as 
the “seminal case” for in-firm privilege.56  The Sunrise court’s mere 
recognition that a law firm may, in some instances, protect its internal 
 
52.  See id. at 595 (“I am now persuaded that it is possible in some instances for a law 
firm, like other business or professional associations, to receive the benefit of the attorney-
client privilege when seeking legal advice from in house counsel.”).  For a discussion of how 
other courts have interpreted the Sunrise court’s acknowledgment of the “possibility” of in-
firm privilege, see infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
53.  In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 595–96 (framing question as balancing of interests).  
But see RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080–81 (Mass. 
2013) (preserving attorney-client privilege for in-firm communications). 
54.  68 F.R.D. 361, 368–69 (D. Del. 1975) (denying privilege in conflict between 
majority and minority shareholders).  In Valente, the minority shareholders of Wilson 
Sporting Goods brought a class action suit arising from Wilson’s merger with PepsiCo.  See 
id. at 364.  At the time of the merger, PepsiCo owned seventy-four percent of Wilson’s stock 
and Peter DeLuca, PepsiCo’s general counsel, sat on Wilson’s board of directors.  See id.  
Through DeLuca, PepsiCo conducted research analyzing the financial and tax consequences 
of various merger strategies.  See id. at 365.   
 When Wilson’s minority shareholders sought to discover this information, PepsiCo 
resisted on attorney-client privilege grounds.  See id. at 366.  Yet, the Valente court rejected 
PepsiCo’s claim to privilege and declared the information discoverable, stating that, “[i]t is a 
common, universally recognized exception to the attorney-client privilege, that where an 
attorney serves two clients having common interests and each party communicates to the 
attorney, the communications are not privileged in a subsequent controversy between the 
two.”  Id. at 368 (citations omitted) (invoking “common interest” exception). 
55.  In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 596–97 (“Because I find that the Valente Court’s well-
reasoned analysis accommodates the interest of both the . . . attorney and the . . . client, I will 
adopt it as the controlling rule in this case.”).  But see RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1081 
(“[C]ompelled disclosure of . . . communications with ethics counsel . . . does little to advance 
the interests of the client (who is owed disclosure of material facts whether or not the first 
attorney has consulted counsel), but does much to undermine the important societal goals 
served by the attorney-client privilege.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
56.  See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1721 (“In re Sunrise is the leading case on the 
current-client issue.”); see also Roy Simon, In-House Ethics Consultations and the Attorney-
Client Privilege: Case Law, N.Y. PROF’L RESP. REP., Jan. 2009, at 1 (referring to Sunrise as 
“Granddaddy Case” of in-firm privilege and providing descriptions of cases following its 
holding). 
9
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communications has led several courts to uphold in-firm privilege outside of the 
current-client context.57  However, seizing on the conflict of interest concerns 
articulated in the decision, the majority of courts have instead utilized Sunrise to 
circumvent the privilege in current-client cases.58  The two most widely cited 
cases reinforcing Sunrise are Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais 
(Suisse), S.A.59 and Koen Book Distributors v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, 
Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C.60 
In 2002, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York addressed the current-client issue in Bank Brussels.61  In Bank Brussels, 
the law firm of Roger & Wells consulted the chair of its ethics committee after 
its client, Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) (CLS), threatened to sue the firm.62  The 
ethics committee conducted an “internal review” of the firm’s representation of 
CLS.63  CLS eventually filed suit and sought discovery of these internal 
communications; however, the firm resisted, claiming the attorney-client 
privilege.64  The Bank Brussels court rejected the firm’s claim to privilege, 
reasoning that “[a]sserting the privilege against a current client seems to create 
an inherent conflict against that client.”65  The court cited Sunrise favorably in 
holding that the firm could not invoke the privilege against a current client for 
 
57.  See, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing 
in-firm privilege for associates assigned to internal investigation); Hertzog, Calamari & 
Gleason v. Prudential Ins. Co., 850 F. Supp. 255, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding privileged 
communications between firm’s attorneys and its in-house counsel); Lama Holding Co. v. 
Shearman & Sterling, No. 89 Civ. 3639 (KTD), 1991 WL 115052, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 
1991) (holding privilege attaches to in-firm communication so long as in-house counsel is 
designated as such); see also Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1732 (discussing broad protection 
for in-firm communication in non-client cases). 
58.  See, e.g., Asset Funding Grp., LLC v. Adams & Reese, LLP, Civil Action No. 07-
2965, 2008 WL 4948835, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2008) (declining to apply privilege due to 
conflict between firm’s fiduciary duties to itself and to client); Thelen Reid & Priest LLP v. 
Marland, No. C 06-2071 VRW, 2007 WL 578989, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007) (rejecting 
in-firm privilege based on fiduciary relationship and conflicting interest between client and 
lawyer); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting in-firm privilege); Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, 
Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 284–85 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(rejecting in-firm privilege); SonicBlue Inc. v. Portside Growth & Opportunity Fund, Bankr. 
Nos. 03-51775, 03-51776, 03-51777, 03-51778-MM, 2008 WL 170562, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 18, 2008) (holding law firms cannot assert privilege against client when 
communications arise out of self-representation on conflict of interest grounds). 
59.  220 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
60.  212 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Pa. 2002).  
61.  See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1736 (explaining that Bank Brussels was first case 
to decide current-client issue after Sunrise). 
62.  See Bank Brussels, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 284 (noting that CLS’s vice president 
threatened “that if CLS were found liable to the RCA Banks, R & W would be liable to 
CLS”). 
63.  See id. (describing internal review process). 
64.  See id. at 285 (explaining early stages of litigation).  
65.  Id. at 287 (finding Roger & Wells had ethical duty to disclose results of its internal 
investigations to CLS and thus, Roger & Wells was in no position to claim privilege). 
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internal communications made during representation.66 
Only a few months after Bank Brussels, the in-firm privilege issue made its 
way back to Pennsylvania in Koen Book.67  In Koen Book, the client, Koen 
Book Distributors, informed its attorneys at Powell Trachtman that it was 
considering filing a malpractice suit against the firm.68  Yet, despite expressing 
its dissatisfaction with Powell Trachtman, Koen Book Distributors continued to 
employ the firm for well over a month.69  During this time, the accused 
attorneys consulted with another lawyer at the firm about the legal and ethical 
implications of their client’s threatened malpractice action.70  When Koen Book 
Distributors eventually sued the firm and sought to compel discovery of Powell 
Trachtman’s internal communications, the firm resisted on attorney-client 
privilege grounds.71  The court relied on the reasoning of Sunrise and Valente 
in holding that the firm “owed a fiduciary duty to [the] plaintiffs while they 
remained clients” and that “[t]his duty is paramount to [the firm’s] own 
interests.”72 
 
66.  See id. at 287–88 (ordering Roger & Wells to produce documents related to its 
internal review of representation of CLS). 
67.  See generally Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman 
& Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (addressing in-firm privilege). 
68.  See id. at 284 (describing client’s threat of malpractice).  Notably, the court does 
not disclose reasons why the client became dissatisfied with the firm.  See id. (stating only that 
Koen Book Distributors was “dissatisfied”).  It is clear, however, that Koen Book Distributors 
retained Powell Trachtman for advice concerning a security interest from one of its customers, 
Crown Books Corporation.  See id.  (explaining nature of representation).  Furthermore, when 
Crown Books went bankrupt, Powell Trachtman represented Koen Book Distributors in the 
bankruptcy proceedings.  See id. (noting representation extended to bankruptcy proceedings). 
69.  See id. (acknowledging Koen Book Distributors’ continued reliance on Powell 
Trachtman’s services after threatening malpractice).  In addition to retaining Powell 
Trachtman from July 9, 2001 (the date malpractice was threatened) to August 13, 2001 (the 
date representation was terminated), Koen Book Distributors also consulted with another law 
firm concerning the quality of Powell Trachtman’s services.  See id. (noting that client 
retained other counsel). 
70.  See id. (describing Powell Trachtman’s internal communications from July 9, 2001 
to August 13, 2001). 
71.  See id. at 283 (declaring firm withheld documents under attorney-client privilege 
and work product doctrines). 
72.  Id. at 286 (rejecting privilege for Powell Trachtman’s in-firm communications).  
The court employed the reasoning of Sunrise, declaring “to the extent that the seeking or 
obtaining of legal advice by one lawyer from another lawyer inside the firm ‘implicates or 
creates a conflict of interest,’ the attorney-client privilege between the lawyers in the firm is 
vitiated.”  Id. at 285 (quoting In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2002)). 
 Despite its discussion endorsing Sunrise, the Koen Book court named Valente as the 
“seminal case.”  See id. (citing Valente v. PepsiCo, 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975)).  Relying 
on Valente, the court determined the proper analysis to be whether Powell Trachtman created 
a conflict of interest when it conducted its internal communications while representing Koen 
Book Distributors.  See id. (“It is a common, universally recognized exception to the attorney-
client privilege, that where an attorney serves two clients having common interest and each 
party communicates to the attorney, the communications are not privileged in a subsequent 
controversy between the two . . . .” (quoting Valente, 68 F.R.D at 368)). 
11
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Despite the fact that the firm was threatened with malpractice only two 
weeks before the client’s bankruptcy hearing, the court in Koen Book stated that 
the firm could have withdrawn as counsel to “[a]void or minimize the 
predicament in which it found itself.”73  The court further suggested that the 
firm could have sought the client’s consent to continue representation “after full 
disclosure and consultation.”74  Nevertheless, because neither “alternative” was 
pursued, the court ordered production of the firm’s internal communications.75 
Koen Book and Bank Brussels are only two of several current-client cases 
where courts have relied upon the reasoning of Sunrise to abrogate in-firm 
privilege.76  Courts in other states—including Washington, California, and 
Louisiana—have also employed exceptions to the attorney-client privilege 
based on Sunrise.77  Yet, as the influence of Sunrise expanded, critics began to 
question the decision’s foundation: Valente.78  These critics have asserted 
several different theories as to why these decisions constitute an inappropriate 
basis for deciding in-firm privilege.79  Some commentators have argued that 
Valente is factually distinguishable, so its reasoning is inapplicable to in-firm 
privilege cases.80  Other commentators have contended that Sunrise, as an 
 
73.  Id. at 286 (indicating that Powell Trachtman could have withdrawn from 
representation).  The court expressed some sympathy for Powell Trachtman, acknowledging 
the firm was threatened with malpractice just one week before Koen Book Distributors’ 
bankruptcy hearing.  See id. (recognizing Powell Trachtman’s “unenviable situation”). 
74.  Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)). 
75.  See id. (rejecting privilege for firm’s communications). 
76.  See Simon, supra note 56 (discussing Sunrise’s expansive influence).  For a further 
discussion of cases relying on Sunrise, see supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
77.  See Simon, supra note 56 (illustrating cases from different jurisdictions relying on 
Sunrise).  For a further discussion of approaches adopted by courts in these jurisdictions, see 
supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 The Supreme Court of the United States recently analyzed the fiduciary exception to the 
attorney-client privilege, explaining that, “English courts first developed the fiduciary 
exception as a principle of trust law in the 19th century.”  United States v. Jicarilla Apache 
Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2321 (2011) (discussing trust law origins of fiduciary exception).  
Moreover, the Court described the exception’s traditional application, stating that, “[t]he rule 
was that when a trustee obtained legal advice to guide the administration of the trust, and not 
for the trustee’s own defense in litigation, the beneficiaries were entitled to the production of 
documents related to that advice.”  Id.  For a discussion of how the fiduciary exception has 
been applied to law firm in-house counsel, see infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
78.  See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1736 (“[W]riters have criticized Valente as the 
foundation for In re Sunrise.  Yet despite the problems with Valente and Sunrise, Sunrise has 
become the touchstone for the current-client analysis.” (footnotes omitted)); see also 
Richmond, Essential Principles, supra note 22, at 829 (“In the end, Valente simply does not 
support abrogating the attorney-client privilege . . . in law firm internal investigations.  Cases 
relying on Valente are therefore inapposite.”). 
79.  For a further discussion of commentators criticizing Sunrise and Valente, see infra 
notes 80–82 and accompanying text.  
80.  See Richmond, Essential Principles, supra note 22, at 829 (“Valente is irrelevant to 
privilege disputes involving law firms’ internal communications because of the context in 
which that case arose.”).  Richmond emphasizes that, for the Valente court, a “key factor” in 
finding DeLuca’s memorandum discoverable was that his “knowledge as PepsiCo’s general 
counsel could not be separated from his knowledge as a Wilson board member.”  Id. at 828 
(citing Valente v. Pepsico, 68 F.R.D. 361, 368 (D. Del. 1975)).  Richmond argues that this 
“key factor” has nothing to do with the current-client cases because “[t]here was no showing 
12
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application of Valente, neglects to consider in-house counsel’s duty to the firm, 
which ultimately undermines the value of in-firm counsel.81 
Given the recent exposure of Sunrise’s weak foundation, courts and critics 
alike are advocating for a reconstruction of the in-firm privilege analysis.82  In a 
positive development, a handful of recent district and appellate court decisions 
have declined to follow Sunrise by preserving the privilege for in-firm 
communications concerning a current client’s threat of malpractice.83  
Ultimately, with several jurisdictions at odds on the issue of in-firm privilege, 
the legal profession has long anticipated direction from higher courts.84 
III. STRAYING FROM THE BLUEPRINT: THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL 
COURT CHOOSES FUNCTION OVER FORM IN RFF FAMILY PARTNERSHIP 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was the first court of 
ultimate jurisdiction to consider the issue of in-firm privilege.85  The court 
rejected commonly invoked exceptions to the attorney-client privilege by 
protecting a law firm’s communications with in-house counsel regarding a 
 
in any of those cases that the law firms’ counsel had the same sort of relationships with their 
clients that DeLuca had with Wilson.”  Id. 
81.  See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1744 (asserting that Sunrise disposes of privilege 
based on firm’s duty to client alone without considering in-house counsel’s duty to its law 
firm).  Professor Chambliss argues that Sunrise as an application of Valente results in an 
approach that is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Upjohn, which 
“emphasizes the role of in-house counsel in promoting organizational compliance with law.”  
Id. at 1743 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981)). 
82.  See TattleTale Alarm Sys. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 2:10–cv–226, 
2011 WL 382627, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011) (“[G]iven the fact that Valente has been 
questioned by other courts as well, it seems reasonable to conclude that any decision which 
relied upon Valente . . . which appears to be the way that Koen Book Distributors interpreted 
it—merits a closer look.”); see also Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1740 (arguing for approach to 
in-firm privilege that balances interests of firms and clients). 
83.  See, e.g., TattleTale Alarm Sys., 2011 WL 382267, at *4–10 (rejecting older case 
law abrogating privilege and holding in-firm communications protected); Garvy v. Seyfarth 
Shaw LLP, 966 N.E.2d 523, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (preserving privilege for in-firm 
communications); MDA City Apartments LLC v. DLA Piper LLP (US), 967 N.E.2d 424, 
429–31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (relying on Garvy and upholding in-firm privilege). 
84.  See generally Rhodes & Tran, supra note 8 (discussing “great debate” concerning 
in-firm privilege and warning lawyers to take caution regarding in-firm communications while 
such uncertainty exists). 
85.  See Joan C. Rogers, Massachusetts High Court Backs Privilege for Consults with 
Firm’s In-House Counsel, 82 U.S. L. WK. 121, 121 (2013) (“The opinion marks the first 
decision by any state’s top court recognizing the in-firm privilege”).  Although the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was the first U.S. court of last resort to recognize the 
in-firm privilege, Georgia followed suit the next day.  See St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. 
Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 108 (Ga. 2013) (holding attorney-client 
privilege and work product protection attached to law firm communications regarding client’s 
possible malpractice claims).  
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current client’s threat of malpractice.86  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court’s decision will impact the ethical and evidentiary standards governing 
lawyers and the legal profession.87 
A. Facts and Procedure 
In RFF Family Partnership, plaintiff RFF Family Partnership (RFF) made 
a $1.4 million commercial loan to Link Development.88  To ensure the loan was 
secured by Link Development’s real property, RFF retained defendant Burns & 
Levinson to investigate the title.89  When Link Development defaulted on its 
payments, Burns & Levinson initiated foreclosure proceedings in land court on 
behalf of RFF.90 
One day before the foreclosure sale, another assignee emerged seeking to 
enjoin the foreclosure on the theory of superior title.91  Although the judge 
denied the assignee’s motion to enjoin, the assignee persisted in the claim.92  
RFF’s title insurer hired the law firm of Prince Lobel Tye (Prince Lobel) to 
represent RFF in the land court proceedings, while Burns & Levinson continued 
to represent RFF in connection with the post-foreclosure sale.93 
One year later, while Burns & Levinson was still actively representing RFF 
in negotiations for sale of the foreclosed property, Prince Lobel sent Burns & 
Levinson a notice of claim alleging legal malpractice for the firm’s failure to 
identify the existing mortgage on Link Development’s property.94  Prince Lobel 
 
86.  See RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080 
(Mass. 2013) (refusing to apply fiduciary and current-client exceptions).  For a discussion of 
the court’s reasoning on this topic, see infra notes 106–16 and accompanying text.  
87.  See generally Debra Squires-Lee & R. Victora Fuller, Measures to Take Following 
‘RFF Family Partnership,’ MASS. LAW. WKLY. (July 18, 2013), http://masslawyersweekly 
.com/2013/07/18/measures-to-take-following-rff-family-partnership/ (discussing implications 
for attorneys following RFF Family Partnership). 
88.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1068 (discussing nature of relationship 
between RFF and Link Development). 
89.  See id. (explaining scope of legal services Burns & Levinson provided to RFF). 
90.  See id. (noting that representation continued throughout foreclosure proceedings). 
91.  See id. (describing assignee’s motion to enjoin foreclosure); see also 33 
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW § 8:20 (3d ed. 2012) (explaining 
theory of superior title under Massachusetts law). 
92.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1068 (“[T]he assignee continued to press its 
claim in the Land Court that its lien was superior to RFF’s and that the foreclosure was 
therefore invalid.”). 
93.  See id. (illustrating that RFF was represented by Prince Lobel and Burns & 
Levinson for separate issues). 
94.  See id. (recounting contents of notice of claim sent by Prince Lobel).  The notice of 
claim alleged that Burns & Levinson “breached its obligations to RFF by . . . failing to 
identify and payoff an existing mortgage of record in favor of another lender, failing to record 
a subordination agreement for another existing mortgage of record, and failing to inform RFF 
of . . . outstanding liens.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Prince Lobel further alleged 
that RFF “suffered and continues to suffer damages [because of] B & L’s legal malpractice 
and breach of contract” and insisted Burns & Levinson reimburse RFF for such losses.  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Prince Lobel attached to the notice of claim a draft of a 
complaint alleging two counts of liability against Burns & Levinson and two against the 
attorneys who had worked with RFF.  See id. (describing draft of complaint). 
14
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demanded that Burns & Levinson respond to its notice of claim within six 
days.95  Two days after receiving the notice of claim, the accused attorneys 
sought advice from Burns & Levinson’s in-house ethics advisor.96  Following 
this consultation, the attorneys sent a letter to RFF providing notice of intent to 
withdraw representation.97  Upon receiving this letter, RFF contacted Burns & 
Levinson, insisting that Prince Lobel’s notice of claim was unauthorized and 
that RFF still desired Burns & Levinson’s representation in the foreclosure 
negotiations.98  Prior to continuing representation, Burns & Levinson 
demanded and later received written confirmation from RFF that it did not 
engage Prince Lobel to bring a malpractice claim against Burns & Levinson.99 
Nonetheless, once representation concluded, RFF sued Burns & Levinson 
alleging malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional 
misrepresentation.100  Burns & Levinson subsequently moved for a protective 
order to keep privileged its communications with in-house counsel regarding 
the notice of claim from Prince Lobel.101  The Superior Court granted the 
defendants’ motion for a protective order, whereupon RFF appealed.102 
 
95.  See id. (providing that RFF had from March 2, 2011 to March 8, 2011 to respond to 
Prince Lobel). 
96.  See id. at 1068–69 (describing in-house counsel’s purpose “to respond to ethical 
questions and risk management issues on behalf of B & L”).  The court emphasized that 
David Rosenblatt, a partner at Burns & Levinson, was specifically designated as in-house 
counsel.  See id. at 1070, 1080 (implementing condition for in-firm privilege that in-house 
counsel must be formally or informally designated as such).  The court also recognized that 
Rosenblatt had never worked on RFF’s case and that the firm did not bill RFF for the firm’s 
risk management communications.  See id. at 1069 (discussing scope of Rosenblatt’s position 
and lack involvement with RFF’s case). 
97.  See id. at 1068–69 (implying Burns & Levinson’s in-house counsel recommended 
withdrawing as counsel).  The letter, sent by Michael MacClary, one of the attorneys accused 
of malpractice, to Robert F. Freedman, RFF’s principal, read:  
As I am sure you are aware, we have received [the notice of claim] from your 
counsel . . . contemplating a law suit against our firm.  Additionally, you have 
significant unpaid legal fees and have not made a payment to us for several months.  
Under these circumstances, we cannot continue representing you.  Accordingly, we 
are withdrawing from further representation effective immediately. 
Id. at 1069 (quoting letter sent to RFF). 
98.  See id. at 1069 (acknowledging that Freedman reached out to Burns & Levinson for 
further representation despite Prince Lobel’s notice of claim). 
99.  See id. (noting that RFF’s principal provided written confirmation requested by 
Burns & Levinson). 
100.  See id. (explaining that action filed by RFF in Superior Court was against Burns 
& Levinson and its two individual attorneys that had represented RFF). 
101.  See id. (summarizing Burns & Levinson’s argument for preserving attorney-client 
privilege for internal communications). 
102.  See id. (“The judge allowed the B & L defendants’ motion for a protective order 
to the extent that he allowed B & L’s attorney to instruct Davidson, MacClary, Perkins, and 
Rosenblatt not to answer questions that would reveal the content of the privileged 
communications among them regarding the notice of claim.”).  The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts also emphasized that it transferred RFF’s appeal to its court on its own motion.  
See id. at 1069–70.   
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B. The Court’s Decision in RFF Family Partnership: A “Form Follows 
Function” Approach to In-Firm Privilege 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the lower court’s 
order protecting the attorneys’ communications with in-house counsel from 
discovery.103  In preserving the attorney-client privilege for Burns & 
Levinson’s internal communications, the court rejected “dysfunctional” 
exceptions to the privilege.104  Additionally, the court limited its holding by 
imposing four conditions on the applicability of the in-firm privilege.105 
1. Refusing to Follow Form: The Court Rejects the Fiduciary and Current-
Client Exceptions to Privilege 
The state supreme court began its analysis of the “fiduciary” and “current-
client” exceptions to privilege by acknowledging that neither exception had 
previously been recognized in Massachusetts.106  After a thorough analysis of 
the fiduciary exception’s origins in trust law, the court declined to decide 
whether Massachusetts should adopt the exception on the grounds that it would 
not apply in the current matter.107  According to its traditional usage, the 
fiduciary exception does not apply in cases where the trustee obtains legal 
advice at the trustee’s own expense and for the trustee’s own protection.108  
Because Burns & Levinson’s internal communications were for the firm’s own 
defense in litigation and were billed to the firm, rather than to RFF, the court 
 
103.  See id. at 1081 (affirming Superior Court). 
104.  See id. at 1075, 1080 (refusing to apply fiduciary and current-client exceptions).  
For a discussion of the court’s reasoning on this topic, see infra notes 106–16 and 
accompanying text.  
105.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080–81 (imposing four conditions for 
privilege to apply).  The court recognized that not all communications made in the law firm 
environment are protected by the attorney-client privilege.  See id. at 1080 (declaring in-firm 
privilege “is not without its limits”).  For further discussion on the four conditions, see infra 
notes 117–22 and accompanying text. 
106.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1074 (“Although Massachusetts law 
recognizes several exceptions to the attorney-client privilege . . . the law of the 
Commonwealth has not yet recognized either of the proposed exceptions.” (citation omitted)).  
Massachusetts recognizes six exceptions to privilege: (1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud; (2) 
Claimants Through Same Deceased Client; (3) Breach of Duty or Obligation; (4) Document 
Attested by an Attorney; (5) Joint Clients; and (6) Public Officer or Agency.  See MASS. R. 
EVID. § 502(d)(1)–(6) (listing situations when attorney-client privilege does not apply). 
107.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1075 (holding fiduciary exception does not 
apply).  For a discussion of the fiduciary exception’s origins and traditional applications, see 
supra note 77. 
108.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1074 (citing United States v. Jicarilla 
Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2321 (2011)) (noting that fiduciary exception does not apply 
where trustee procures legal advice for its own protection).  Additionally, the United States 
Supreme Court recently emphasized the probative value of determining who incurred 
expenses in fiduciary exception cases.  See Jicarilla, 131 S. Ct. at 2322 (“That the advice was 
obtained at the beneficiaries’ expense was not only a ‘significant factor’ entitling the 
beneficiaries to see the document but also ‘a strong indication of precisely who the real clients 
were.’” (quoting Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 712 (Del. Ch. 
1976))).  For a further discussion of Jicarilla, see supra note 77. 
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declared the fiduciary exception inapplicable.109 
Next, the court refused to adopt the current-client exception, deeming it a 
“flawed interpretation of the rules of professional conduct that yields a 
dysfunctional result.”110  The court rejected the Sunrise line of authority on the 
grounds that its reasoning contained two “fundamental flaws.”111  First, the 
court noted that most decisions employing the current-client exception do so by 
implicitly applying the conflict of interest rules through imputation under 
Model Rule 1.10(a).112  While imputation generally precludes attorneys in the 
same firm from representing outside clients that are adverse to one another, the 
court found no evidence to support the assertion that Rule 1.10 prohibits in-
house counsel from providing legal advice to its own firm regarding a current-
client matter.113  Second, “black-letter law” provides that even when an 
 
109.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1076 (“[A] client is not entitled to . . . 
communications [that] were conducted for the law firm’s own defense against the client’s 
adverse claims.”).  Moreover, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dismissed RFF’s 
proposition that the fiduciary exception excluded from the attorney-client privilege not only 
confidential communications between the attorneys and in-house counsel but also their 
confidential communications with outside counsel.  See id. at 1075–76 (“This proposed rule 
would be the most dysfunctional of all because it would deny a law firm and its attorneys any 
protection provided by the attorney-client privilege . . . .”).  Furthermore, the court deemed the 
fiduciary exception “draconian” and unnecessary “to protect the interests of clients.”  Id. at 
1076 (explaining that preserving privilege does not affect lawyer’s duty to provide client full 
and fair disclosure of facts relevant to representation). 
110.  Id. at 1080 (“We do not believe that the conflicts rules . . . were intended to 
prohibit ethics consultation when it is most helpful: during client representation.” (alteration 
in original) (quoting N.Y. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 789 (2005)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
111.  See id. at 1078 (rejecting reasoning of current-client exception). 
112.  See id. at 1078 n.8 (“Although none of the courts that have applied the ‘current 
client’ exception explicitly acknowledges that it is relying on the rule of imputation, most 
implicitly do so . . . .”); see also Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 
220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 288 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (“[I]t is common knowledge that a conflict as to 
one attorney at a firm is a conflict as to all.”); Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1745 (“According 
to the logic of In re Sunrise et al., a conflict of interest must be imputed to firm in-house 
counsel regardless of the structure of the in-house position or the facts of the representation at 
issue.”).  In RFF Family Partnership, the court explained that, under the imputation analysis, 
Burns & Levinson’s in-house counsel represented the firm in defending RFF’s threatened 
malpractice claim; however, applying Rule 1.10(a), in-house counsel would also be deemed to 
represent RFF.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1077 (applying imputation to Burns & 
Levinson). 
113.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1078 (highlighting imputation rule’s lack 
of reference to advice from in-house counsel).  Moreover, the court states that it would be 
nonsensical to apply the rule of imputation in the current-client context because the rule’s 
rationales would not be furthered in doing so.  See id.  (“The primary reasons for imputation 
are to [give] effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice 
in a law firm and to prevent the misuse of confidential information by lawyers in the same 
firm.” (alteration in original) (quoting Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1747–48) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  But see Zitrin, supra note 14 (“It is obviously counterintuitive that 
a law firm has more protection in representing itself adversely to its own client than it would 
representing a third party, and in fact Rule 1.10 says nothing of the sort.”). 
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attorney fails to avoid a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7, the communications 
remain privileged notwithstanding the attorney’s misconduct.114  The court 
declared that this law applies even when the “client” is a law firm and the 
“attorney” is the firm’s in-house counsel.115  The court also noted that the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers identifies thirteen possible 
sanctions for a law firm’s breach of Rule 1.7, none of which mention disclosure 
of otherwise privileged communications.116 
2. Design with Necessary Limitations: The Court Imposes Four Conditions 
for In-Firm Privilege to Apply 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the 
attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between a firm’s 
attorneys and its in-house counsel, the court limited its ruling by imposing four 
conditions to be met before the privilege can apply.117  First, the firm must 
designate a lawyer or lawyers within the firm to represent the firm as in-house 
or ethics counsel.118  Second, in the event that a current client threatens 
litigation against the firm, the in-house counsel must not have worked on that 
that client’s case or any “substantially related matter.”119  Third, the time 
dedicated to consultation with in-house or ethics counsel cannot be billed to the 
client.120  Fourth, as with all client consultations, the in-firm communications 
 
114.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1079 (“‘[T]he black-letter law is that when 
an attorney (improperly) represents two clients whose interests are adverse, the 
communications are privileged against each other notwithstanding the lawyer’s misconduct.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE Inc., 493 F.3d 345, 369 
(3d Cir. 2007))).  
115.  See id. (finding that disclosure of attorney-client communications would be 
inappropriate sanction for Burns & Levinson). 
116.  See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 6, at 
65–66 (2000)).  The court noted that “[w]ith the exception of the final catch-all remedy of 
entering an ‘other sanction,’ none of these remedies includes disclosure of otherwise 
privileged communications.”  Id. at 1079; see also id. at 1079 n.11 (citing RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 6, at 65–66 (2000)) (listing remedies under 
Restatement). 
117.  See id. at 1080–81 (“Such a rule . . . is not without its limits . . . .”); see also 
Barbara S. Gillers, Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege for the Advice of a Law Firm’s 
In-House Counsel, 2000 PROF. LAW. SYMP. ISSUES 107, 111 (recommending that firms take 
precautionary measures to preserve in-firm privilege). 
118.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (providing that designation of in-
house or ethics counsel can be either formal or informal); see also Gillers, supra note 117, at 
111 (urging firm managers to “[i]dentify specifically the lawyers in the firm who will give the 
firm legal advice in the matter”). 
119.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (explaining second condition for 
privilege to apply); see also Gillers, supra note 117, at 111 (“Distinguish between the firm 
lawyers who are the clients and the firm lawyers who are the counsel.  Those who are counsel 
to the firm should have no involvement in the underlying matters.”). 
120.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (“Because the law firm is the client 
with respect to such communications, their cost must be borne by the law firm.”); see also 
Gillers, supra note 117, at 111 (“Set up a separate billing number for the matter in which the 
in-house lawyer acts as the firm’s lawyer.  Time should be billed to that number as it would be 
to a client.”). 
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must remain confidential.121  Because each of these four conditions was “either 
properly found . . . or undisputed,” the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed the lower court’s ruling allowing Burns & Levinson to preserve the 
confidentiality of its communications with in-house counsel.122 
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: THE COURT IN RFF FAMILY PARTNERSHIP PROVIDES A 
FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK THAT BENEFITS LAWYERS AND CLIENTS ALIKE 
By preserving the attorney-client privilege for in-firm communications 
concerning current clients, the RFF Family Partnership court provided the 
functional framework the legal profession had been waiting for.123  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision has elicited approval from 
courts, commentators, and even the American Bar Association.124  Unlike the 
previous in-firm privilege decisions, the court provided a clear analysis and 
considered real world implications throughout its decision.125  Moreover, the 
court limited its holding to ensure the privilege applies only where 
 
121.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (“[A]s with all attorney-client 
communications, they must be made in confidence and kept confidential.”); see also Gillers, 
supra note 117, at 111 (“Inform partners and employees who are interviewed by the 
designated counsel that their cooperation is necessary to assist counsel in giving legal advice 
to the firm, that their communications with the designated attorneys are confidential, and that 
the communications should be kept confidential.” (emphasis added)). 
122.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080–81 (affirming lower court’s ruling 
because four conditions were satisfied).  Compare St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, 
Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 108 (Ga. 2013) (imposing four elements for in-
firm privilege), with RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080–81 (imposing four conditions 
for privilege to apply).  In St. Simons Waterfront, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the 
attorney-client privilege applies to communications between a law firm’s attorneys and its in-
house counsel regarding a client’s threatened malpractice where: 
(1) [T]here is a genuine attorney-client relationship between the firm’s lawyers and 
in-house counsel; (2) the communications in question were intended to advance the 
firm’s interests in limiting exposure to liability rather than the client’s interests in 
obtaining sound legal representation; (3) the communications were conducted and 
maintained in confidence, and (4) no exception to the privilege applies. 
St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 108 (requiring all four elements be satisfied for privilege 
to apply). 
123.  See Squires-Lee & Fuller, supra note 87, at 1 (discussing Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court’s clear guidance). 
124.  See, e.g., St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 108 (recognizing in-firm privilege 
after RFF Family Partnership); see also ABA Resolution 103, supra note 15, at 15 (“It is in 
the public interest for the law to encourage and facilitate the use of law firm in-house counsel 
and, by this resolution, the American Bar Association recognizes that client representation 
will be advanced by permitting confidential consultation in this manner.”); Fields, supra note 
15 (applauding Massachusetts’s decision). 
125.  See Rogers, supra note 85, at 121 (“‘[T]here was an almost solid wall of federal 
trial court decisions denying privilege . . . .  But those decisions failed to consider important 
lines of authority . . . that have now been utilized in . . . RFF Family Partnership.’” (quoting 
William T. Barker, Partner, Dentons)); see also Squires-Lee & Fuller, supra note 87, at 1 
(“The SJC provided clear guidance to law firms about when and under what circumstances the 
privilege would apply.”). 
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appropriate.126 
By refusing to allow “legal doctrine [to] trump functionality,” 
Massachusetts has developed a practical analysis for in-firm privilege that 
improves law firm efficiency and law firm adherence to ethical rules.127  
Because these nuanced improvements ultimately benefit both lawyers and their 
clients, it would behoove jurisdictions following Sunrise to draw upon 
Massachusetts’s framework as a model for modernizing their in-firm privilege 
analyses.128 
A. Public Reaction to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s Holding: 
What About the Client? 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s holding in RFF Family 
Partnership has triggered much debate about whether the decision properly 
reconciles the interest in preserving the privilege with the ethical obligations 
attorneys owe their clients.129  Members of the legal profession have supported 
Massachusetts’s in-firm privilege analysis stating that the decision “will result 
in the provision of better legal services both to clients and the law firms that 
serve them.”130  Conversely, one author on legal ethics concluded that, “courts 
ruling this way are simply protecting the interests of lawyers over those of 
clients, and that is inexcusable.”131  Moreover, the Association of Corporate 
Counsel (ACC) has expressed disagreement, stating “[l]aw firms owe their 
clients a profound duty of loyalty under the ethics rules . . . .  It is this duty of 
loyalty that prohibits law firms from claiming a privilege to let them hide 
information from existing clients.”132 
However, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s holding should not 
be interpreted as an unchecked extension of privilege that benefits law firms 
alone.133  Rather, the RFF Family Partnership ruling is broad enough to 
 
126.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (limiting holding to apply only if 
four conditions are met); see also Gillers, supra note 117, at 111 (recommending “careful not 
casual” approach for attorney communications with in-house counsel). 
127.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1074 (refusing to join other jurisdictions in 
adopting exceptions to privilege); see also infra notes 133–45 and accompanying text 
(highlighting improvements resulting from Massachusetts’s decision). 
128.  See Fields, supra note 15 (noting that decision is fair for lawyers and prudent for 
clients). 
129.  Compare Zitrin, supra note 14 (arguing RFF Family Partnership benefits lawyers 
over clients), with Fields, supra note 15 (arguing RFF Family Partnership is fair for lawyers 
and clients alike). 
130.  Squires-Lee & Fuller, supra note 87, at 1 (approving of Massachusetts’s decision 
in RFF Family Partnership). 
131.  Zitrin, supra note 14 (arguing RFF Family Partnership allows lawyers to be 
disloyal to their clients). 
132.  ACC Files Amicus Brief with the Oregon Supreme Court in Crimson Trace Legal 
Malpractice Case, ASS’N CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.acc.com/aboutacc/ 
newsroom/pressreleases/acc-files-amicus-oregon-supreme-court-in-crimson.cfm (asserting 
position in opposition to Massachusetts’s decision in RFF Family Partnership).  
133.  See RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080 
(Mass. 2013) (“[A]pplying the privilege in such contexts will often benefit the client and will 
likely result in increased law firm compliance with ethical obligations . . . .”). 
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encourage law firm use of in-house counsel for current-client issues but is 
sufficiently limited to ensure the privilege will apply only where appropriate.134  
By achieving this balance, the court in RFF Family Partnership permits a more 
efficient and ethical legal environment that serves the interests of lawyers and 
clients alike.135 
First, the court’s decision in RFF Family Partnership increases law firm 
efficiency.136  The recognition of in-firm privilege eliminates the need for law 
firms to secure outside counsel when issues with a current client arise.137  
While it is clear this development saves firms time and money, it also ultimately 
results in more timely legal advice for clients.138  Moreover, by allowing 
attorneys to consult with in-house counsel prior to deciding whether to 
withdraw from a client’s case, the RFF Family Partnership framework 
mitigates potential harm to the client.139  For example, the Burns & Levinson 
attorneys were in the middle of active negotiations for RFF when they received 
the notice of claim.140  If the attorneys were required to withdraw as counsel at 
the first inkling of malpractice, RFF would have likely suffered from the halted 
foreclosure sale.141 
 
134.  See Squires-Lee & Fuller, supra note 87, at 2 (“The four-part formula 
appropriately balances the concerns of clients and attorneys . . . .”). 
135.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (discussing how framework of four-
part formula benefits lawyers and clients). 
136.  See id. at 1074 (finding that attorneys are not required to retain outside counsel or 
withdraw unnecessarily when current-client issues arise); see also Chambliss, supra note 4, at 
1747 (“Requiring the firm to obtain outside counsel or withdraw from the representation also 
does not serve the interests of the outside client.  Certainly, the client is not better off if the 
firm retains outside counsel.”). 
137.  See TattleTale Alarm Sys. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 2:10–cv–226, 
2011 WL 382627, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011) (“While consultation with outside counsel 
might be a fair substitute in some cases, by the time a matter has progressed to the point where 
outside counsel are called in, it may be too late to protect the client from damage.”); RFF 
Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (rejecting RFF’s argument that outside counsel was 
“practical alternative” for Burns & Levinson); see also ABA Resolution 103, supra note 15, at 
15 (“Any distinction between in-house and outside counsel in this regard elevates form over 
substance.”). 
138.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1074 (“[A]part from the additional cost to 
the law firm, [retaining outside counsel] may delay the receipt of the ethical advice because 
new counsel will need to be retained and the new counsel’s law firm will need to complete its 
own conflicts check.”). 
139.  See id. (noting that withdrawing prematurely does not adequately protect client 
interests); see also Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1747 (“[T]he client’s interest may be seriously 
harmed by encouraging the firm to withdraw at the first hint of a problem because withdrawal 
limits the firm’s opportunity (and incentive?) to mitigate harm to the client.” (citing Anthony 
E. Davis, Professional Responsibility: Multijurisdictional Practice, Internal Discussions, 
Counsel’s Advice, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 2003, at 3)). 
140.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1068 (noting Burns & Levinson was 
actively representing RFF in foreclosure sale when Burns & Levinson received Prince Lobel’s 
notice of claim). 
141.  See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1747 (discussing potential harm to client when 
attorneys withdraw from representation before mitigating harm). 
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Second, the court’s decision in RFF Family Partnership fosters a more 
ethical law firm environment.142  By assuring attorneys that their 
communications will remain protected, the court’s decision facilitates complete 
candor with in-house counsel.143  This reassurance essentially eliminates any 
“chilling effect,” thereby encouraging lawyers to raise issues they might 
otherwise conceal or ignore.144  This collaborative effort ultimately provides 
clients with better-informed advice and the reassurance that their lawyers are 
maintaining ethical standards in their work.145 
B. Massachusetts’s Framework as a Model for Jurisdictions Needing 
Renovation 
While many courts have simply followed the majority by adopting 
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege in cases where a current client is 
involved, the court in RFF Family Partnership refused to blindly rely on 
existing precedent.146  Rather, the court constructed an innovative framework 
 
142.  See ABA Resolution 103, supra note 15, at 15 (“[T]he attorney-client privilege for 
consultations with in-house counsel is critical to ensuring that attorneys and other law firm 
personnel receive the best possible advice on complicated legal and ethical issues.”); see also 
Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, Inside an In-House Ethics Practice, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 103, 112 (2003) (noting principal effect of in-house ethics counsel is to 
“keep ethics issues in the forefront . . . .”).  Peter Jarvis and Mark Fucile further assert that the 
particular attention paid to ethics issues through in-house counsel influences the culture of the 
firm in at least three overlapping ways: 
A firm that expressly devotes personnel to ethics issues is telling its lawyers that it 
cares about those issues and their resolution; a firm with readily available and user-
friendly ethics resources makes it easier for its attorneys to comply with the rules 
and to avoid taking imprudent or unnecessary risks; firm morale is improved when 
lawyers know they can get reliable help when they need it. 
Id. (describing in-house ethics counsel’s influence on firm culture). 
143.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1074 (acknowledging that “sugar-coating” 
would occur if attorneys consulted in-house counsel without the guarantee of privilege); see 
also Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1754 (“[E]ven well-meaning clients need the privilege to 
encourage them to reveal questionable conduct and voice their fears about liability.”). 
144.  See TattleTale Alarm Sys. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 2:10-cv-226, 
2011 WL 382267, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011) (highlighting importance of reassuring 
attorneys that their communications will remain confidential through preservation of in-firm 
privilege).  The court in TattleTale further reasoned that “[i]f . . . lawyers believe that these 
communications will eventually be revealed to the client in the context of a legal malpractice 
case, they will be much less likely to seek prompt advice from members of the same firm.”  
Id. 
145.  See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1765 (discussing benefits of in-house ethics 
counsel for firm and clients).  Furthermore, Professor Chambliss argues that encouraged use 
of in-house counsel has day-to-day benefits outside the arena of malpractice litigation, stating 
that, “[i]n the long run, clients collectively stand to benefit far more from firms’ investment in 
in-house counsel than from sporadic access to in-firm communication in lawyer-client 
disputes.”  Id. 
146.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1074–80 (declining to join other 
jurisdictions that allow “legal doctrine to trump functionality”).  For a further discussion of 
these cases, see infra notes 147–51 and accompanying text; see also Barker, supra note 24, at 
471 (noting that flawed reasoning in Valente has become foundation for unsound case law, 
and urging courts to reconsider its application). 
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that preserves the privilege while still respecting the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.147  However, Pennsylvania’s rigid approach to in-firm 
privilege makes achieving this balance impossible.148  Under Koen Book, 
Pennsylvania firms cannot even protect their communications with outside 
counsel from discovery if the communications involve a current client’s 
threatened malpractice action.149  Given the unfortunate and expansive 
influence of Sunrise, this dysfunctional approach is not just isolated to 
Pennsylvania but exists within several other jurisdictions.150  These 
jurisdictions relying on Sunrise should reconstruct their approaches to in-firm 
privilege in light of RFF Family Partnership.151 
Massachusetts’s framework provides an in-firm privilege analysis that 
values real world implications over existing precedent.152  Unlike the court in 
 
147.  See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1740 (advocating for frameworks governed by 
ethical rules and traditional privilege analysis); see also Fields, supra note 15 (discussing 
Massachusetts’s framework in context of Model Rules). 
148.  See Barker, supra note 24, at 470–71 (critiquing Pennsylvania’s approach under 
Koen Book).  Barker dissects Pennsylvania’s in-firm privilege analysis in Koen Book, stating, 
“Koen Book[] suggests that the lawyers should withdraw to permit defense preparations.  But 
a lawyer who has not been discharged cannot withdraw without taking actions necessary to 
prevent prejudice to the client and, if the representation is before a tribunal, without the 
tribunal’s permission.”  Id. at 470 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 
(2003)).  Barker argues that, for both of these reasons, the lawyers in Koen Book “probably 
could not have withdrawn until completion of the bankruptcy hearing.”  Id. 
149.  See Richmond, Essential Principles, supra note 22, at 831 (criticizing Koen 
Book’s in-firm privilege analysis as flawed and rigid). 
150.  See Simon, supra note 56 (naming Sunrise as “seminal” in-firm privilege case and 
describing six cases relying on its ruling).  For a further discussion of jurisdictions employing 
the reasoning of Sunrise, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
151.  See Fields, supra note 15 (expressing hope that Massachusetts’s decision will 
influence other courts to recognize in-firm privilege).  Moreover, the legal profession is 
projected to see wider recognition of in-firm privilege with the added support of the American 
Bar Association’s most recent resolution.  See Rogers, ABA Formally Backs Privilege, supra 
note 14 (“[T]he new policy will provide a strong footing for ABA advocacy on the issue [of 
in-firm privilege].”).  The ABA Resolution provides:  
The ABA strongly supports the preservation of the attorney-client privilege and 
work product doctrine as essential to maintaining the confidential relationship 
between client and attorney required to encourage clients to discuss their legal 
matters fully and candidly with their counsel so as to (1) promote compliance with 
law through effective counseling, (2) ensure effective advocacy for the client, (3) 
ensure access to justice and (4) promote the proper and efficient functioning of the 
American adversary system of justice. 
ABA Resolution 103, supra note 15, at 3 (supplying ABA’s stance on in-firm privilege). 
152.  See RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1073, 
1080 (Mass. 2013) (providing implications for RFF’s proposed alternatives).  Counsel for 
RFF argued that attorneys faced with a malpractice claim by a client have four practical 
alternatives: (1) withdraw from the representation “without first consulting with better 
informed and more dispassionate in-house ethics counsel”; (2) advise the client of the conflict 
(without first consulting with in-house counsel), and ask for the client’s consent to consult 
with in-house counsel; (3) confer with in-house counsel without pursuing the two previously 
listed alternatives and accept the risk the communications could be discovered; or (4) retain 
outside counsel.  See id. at 1073–74 (proposing alternatives). 
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Koen Book, which unquestioningly relied on a colleague’s opinion in Sunrise, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court thoroughly analyzed the origins and 
applications of the fiduciary and current-client exceptions along with their 
harmful implications.153  In doing so, the court’s rejection of both exceptions 
aligns with that of several commentators who believe these exceptions stem 
from poorly reasoned case law.154  By declining to follow form over function, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court diminished the credibility of these 
older decisions and instead conveyed precisely how abrogating in-firm privilege 
can produce dysfunctional results for lawyers and their clients.155 
Moreover, the Massachusetts framework ensures that the privilege applies 
only in appropriate circumstances.156  While attorneys deserve candid and 
confidential access to in-house counsel just like anyone else, the court in RFF 
Family Partnership recognizes the harm that could result from an overbroad 
extension of in-firm privilege.157  By limiting its holding, the court essentially 
 
 The court rejected RFF’s argument that its proposed courses of action constituted 
“practical alternatives.”  See id. at 1073.  Regarding the first alternative of suggesting 
withdrawal, the court stated that, “[this] alternative poses the risk that a law firm, without the 
benefit of expert advice, may unnecessarily withdraw from a representation where the 
apparent conflict was illusory or reparable, or withdraw without adequately protecting the 
client’s interests.”  Id. at 1074.  The court also rejected the second alternative, stating that it 
“poses the risk that the law firm may advise the client about the conflict before itself obtaining 
the advice that would enable it better to understand the conflict.”  Id.  As for the third 
alternative, suggesting the attorney accept the risk of discovery, the court stated that it could 
result in “the information provided to in-house counsel [being] withheld or ‘sugar-coated’ 
because of the risk of disclosure to the client, and the advice received will suffer from the lack 
of candor.”  Id.  In response to RFF’s fourth alternative, the court found it to be expensive and 
noted that it “may delay the receipt of the ethical advice because new counsel will need to be 
retained and the new counsel’s law firm will need to complete its own conflicts check.”  Id.  
The court rejected each of the alternatives as “dysfunctional,” because none of the options 
best served the interests of the client or the firm.  See id. (justifying rejection of alternatives). 
153.  See id. at 1074–80 (analyzing origins and applications of fiduciary and current-
client exceptions); see also Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, 
Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 284–85 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“My colleague, Judge 
Thomas O’Neill, faced a like issue a number of years ago in [In re Sunrise].” (citation 
omitted)). 
154.  See Rogers, supra note 85, at 121 (“‘[T]here was an almost solid wall of federal 
trial court decisions denying privilege . . . .  But those decisions failed to consider important 
lines of authority . . . that have now been utilized in . . . RFF Family Partnership.’” (quoting 
William T. Barker, Partner, Dentons)).  Regarding these poorly-reasoned cases, attorneys 
commenting on RFF Family Partnership have noted that “[a]nyone seeking to rely on the old 
federal cases must now grapple with [RFF Family Partnership] and the previously overlooked 
lines of authority on which they were based.”  Id. (predicting that it will be difficult to rely on 
older case law barring in-firm privilege after RFF Family Partnership). 
155.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (“[F]orm should follow function, and 
we prefer a formulation of the attorney-client privilege that encourages attorneys faced with 
the threat of legal action by a client to seek the legal advice of in-house ethics counsel . . . .”). 
156.  See id. (“For the privilege to apply, four conditions must be met.”). 
157.  See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder 
Litigation and Similar Cases: Garner Revisited, 12 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 817, 846 (1984) 
(“Those who have fiduciary responsibility often want legal advice concerning their 
responsibilities.  They should have the same opportunity to consult with counsel and to speak 
freely and without fear of making admissions as any other clients.”).  But see Gillers, supra 
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minimized the risk that in-firm communication will result in ethical 
violations.158  For example, the conditions imposed in RFF Family Partnership 
better define the attorney-client relationship between a firm’s attorneys and in-
house counsel, thereby lessening the likelihood of impermissible conflicts of 
interest under Model Rule 1.7.159  Moreover, the conditions also require that all 
communications remain confidential thereby reinforcing the disclosure 
rationales articulated by Rule 1.6.160 
Lastly, the court in RFF Family Partnership reiterated the need for such 
conditions by acknowledging that “not every attorney in a law firm is its in-
house counsel and not every communication within a law firm is privileged.”161  
By effectively isolating the application of in-firm privilege to appropriate 
circumstances, the court also upheld the rationale conveyed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Upjohn: 
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the 
attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of 
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.  An 
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in 
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no 
privilege at all.162 
By implementing four conditions for privilege, the court in RFF Family 
Partnership provides the certainty and predictability required by Upjohn.163 
 
note 117, at 108 (“A casual approach [to privilege], however, is risky: Just because lawyers 
consult lawyers, the privilege is not necessarily preserved.”). 
158.  See Gillers, supra note 117, at 111 (urging firms to take precautionary measures 
for in-firm communication to ensure compliance with ethical rules). 
159.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (requiring in-house counsel to be 
designated as such, to have not preformed work on client’s matter, and to bill in-house 
communications to firm); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2012) 
(outlining lawyers’ obligation to avoid impermissible conflicts of interest); Squires-Lee & 
Fuller, supra note 87, at 1 (discussing four conditions and suggesting practice management 
pointers for ensuring privilege applies). 
160.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (“[A]s with all attorney-client 
communications, they must be made in confidence and kept confidential.”); see also MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (precluding disclosure of confidential information relating 
to client’s representation). 
161.  RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (justifying need for limited holding). 
162.  Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (expressing need for 
clarity as to when privilege applies). 
163.  See id. (refusing to adopt privilege analysis that resulted in “disparate decisions”).  
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of certainty in privilege throughout its 
analysis of the “control-group test” as applied within the context of a corporation’s 
communications with in-house counsel.  See id.  The Court rejected the test because its past 
applications “illustrate[d] its unpredictability.”  See id. 
 The Massachusetts decision affirms the rationale of Upjohn by providing four clear 
conditions for in-firm privilege to apply.  See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 
(cautioning that “not every communication within a law firm is privileged” and implementing 
four conditions); see also Rogers, supra note 85, at 121 (“‘[T]he opinion imposes four 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Fortunately for lawyers and their clients, Massachusetts’s framework for 
in-firm privilege has already proved influential in other states.164  Just one day 
after the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s decision in RFF Family 
Partnership, Georgia’s Supreme Court followed suit by preserving the attorney-
client privilege for in-firm communications concerning a current client.165 
While these decisions are a significant step for in-firm privilege, the reality 
is that they only constitute controlling authority in Massachusetts and 
Georgia.166  In many jurisdictions, it remains unclear whether the attorney-
client privilege protects discussions with in-house ethics counsel involving 
current-client matters.167  Even worse, in Pennsylvania, and states adopting its 
precedent, attorneys’ conversations with in-house counsel remain unprotected if 
they fall within the current-client context.168  Nevertheless, with the American 
Bar Association’s recent endorsement of both Massachusetts’s and Georgia’s 
decisions, the legal profession remains hopeful that in-firm privilege will soon 
be widely recognized.169 
 
 
realistic practical requirements to insure that the privilege will apply only in appropriate 
cases.’  These four requirements ‘should serve as a list of best practices for law firms that 
want to insure that their communications with in-house counsel remain protected’ . . . .” 
(quoting Richard M. Zielinski, Director, Goulston & Storrs)).  
164.  See, e.g., St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 
746 S.E.2d 98, 102 (Ga. 2013) (recognizing in-firm privilege one day after Massachusetts); 
see also Fields, supra note 15 (noting that both courts identified similar circumstances under 
which confidential communications between attorneys and in-house counsel are protected). 
165.  See St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 108 (“[T]he attorney-client privilege 
applies to communications between a law firm’s attorneys and its in-house counsel regarding 
a client’s potential claims against the firm . . . .”). 
166.  See Squires-Lee & Fuller, supra note 87, at 2 (describing jurisdictional 
limitations). 
167.  See id. (acknowledging uncertainty in many jurisdictions). 
168.  See Richmond, Essential Principles, supra note 22, at 831 (criticizing 
Pennsylvania’s approach under Koen Book).  For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s in-
firm privilege precedent, see supra notes 47–84 and accompanying text. 
169.  See ABA Resolution 103, supra note 15, at 15 (“It is in the public interest for the 
law to encourage and facilitate the use of law firm in-house counsel and, by this resolution, 
the American Bar Association recognizes that client representation will be advanced by 
permitting confidential consultation in this manner.”). 
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